Over the course of 2024, multiple conflicts – from Ukraine to the Middle East, from the Korean peninsula to Sudan, from Venezuela to Mozambique – have laid bare a harsh reality: the world is entering an era without leaders. For all the talk of a hypothetical ‘G2’ world, comprised of an informal economic relationship between the United Sates and China, neither country is prepared to lead in global affairs. The US is too absorbed in domestic divisions, as evidenced in its ongoing presidential election campaigns; China is focused on addressing its domestic economic weaknesses such as a stagnant real estate market and low consumer spending.
This lack of direct leadership means that no global conflict is on course to be resolved. On the contrary, the world is witnessing levels of destruction and inhumanity not seen since the second world war. And as other global powers increasingly vie for geopolitical control, whether directly or through proxies, the risk of a major global confrontation is also growing. This poses a particular challenge for the European Union: from Belarus to the Sahel, its neighbourhood is surrounded by an arch of fire. America – its most important ally – is increasingly inward-looking.
The uncomfortable truth for Europe is that Donald Trump is not its problem, and Kamala Harris is not its solution. Instead, Europe’s fate is largely in its own hands
But the uncomfortable truth for Europe is that Donald Trump is not its problem; and Kamala Harris is not its solution. Instead, Europe’s fate is largely in its own hands. To prepare for a world with less America, more Europe is the aim of the game. Over the last two decades, the bloc has faced successive existential challenges – the 2008 financial crisis, Brexit, the covid pandemic, and Russia’s invasion of the EU’s neighbour, Ukraine – but has consistently defied the odds to face these threats head on. Humility and the avoidance of hubris have helped the EU to understand its own strengths, as well as its own fragilities. It should again employ this approach to cope with a world defined by the foreign policy shifts of global powers.
However, creeping nationalism and the bloc’s failure to anticipate challenges to the status quo is a prime example of how, if left unaddressed, the EU’s fragilities could prove fatal. Nationalism could weaken the EU as hostile interests will “divide and conquer” its member states to advance their own interests: for example in 2017, when Donald Trump’s presidency fostered relations with hostile governments in Poland and Hungary at the expense of EU cooperation. The EU’s failure to anticipate such structural challenges prompts the response of “too little too late”, but this rhetoric is simply insufficient when considering the actions required to strengthen the bloc’s resilience to future malicious intent.
Irrespective of the result of the US election, over the European Parliament’s next five-year mandate the EU needs to focus on improving its economic performance, strengthening its defence capabilities, and protecting its democracies. But the EU will be more successful if it combines a domestic agenda with forging strong alliances with a variety of countries around the world. Instead of isolating itself geopolitically, the EU should forge resilience through a network of partnerships with countries across Africa, Asia, and Latin America based on mutual interest. This is especially important since emerging geopolitical partnerships with alternative global powers means many target countries have choices beyond the EU: in response, the bloc needs to deploy its far-reaching policies on trade, climate and finance with a geopolitical perspective.
Securing access to raw materials is essential in the move towards a greener climate policy and for the digital transition, which in turn will impact Europe’s economic security; but the EU lacks production and refining capacities. At the same time, narrow raw material agreements with third countries run the risk of being perceived as one-sided and purely extractive, with no benefit for the provider. A successful partnership could therefore centre around the “Global Gateway” – the European version of the Belt and Road initiative – although its financing capacity, market access, and sustainability standards need enhancement. In particular, access to finance is a major concern for partner countries in Africa and central Asia. Here, the EU could aim bigger by leveraging its own limited budget with the financing capacities of the European Investment Bank. If approached sensitively, enhanced market access would offer more opportunities for third counties and greater economic resilience for the EU. Including sustainability standards in bilateral dialogues would also help assuage concerns about green unilateralism.
Similarly, the EU should deploy its trade policy more strategically in order to anchor its relations with willing partners. Its quest for greater strategic autonomy faces a crucial credibility test in Latin America where two low-hanging fruits are available: the revamped EU-Mexico agreement and the EU-Mercosur partnership. Together, these partners are worth around 6 per cent of global GDP. The former, agreed in 2018, replaces a previous deal between the EU and Mexico from 2000; but the EU-Mercosur partnership, which has been long in the making and faces protectionist headwinds on both sides of the Atlantic, is of crucial economic and geopolitical importance. Once ratified, it will provide both regions with a stronger trading partnership and therefore greater resilience to external economic forces.
The EU should also use the next five years to directly engage in the Indo-Pacific region, which is home to many of the world’s fastest growing nations and one the world’s geopolitical fault-lines. The EU should build a trade and investment alliance with the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), a regional grouping of 12 members (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and Vietnam) which was created in 2018 following America’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. This grouping now represents over 13 per cent of global GDP.
While the EU already has bilateral agreements with nine CPTPP members, there is merit in connecting these – and adding the missing three – through a common protocol on rules of origin and building a space for regulatory cooperation on issues such as sustainability standards, value chain due diligence, digital trade, and economic security. A potential ‘three oceans alliance’, connecting the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian oceans as a vast area of trade and investment space, would also provide the EU and CPTPP with a greater ability to withstand geopolitical forces.
Finally, the EU should retain its leading role in the World Trade Organisation. It would be well-advised to keep investing in the reform of dispute settlement, advance plurilateral agreements with like-minded countries, and enhance trade and climate policy dialogues to secure its own self-interest against unilateral, power-driven politics.
Overall, the next five years offers exciting opportunities for the EU to use the global economy and changing trade relations to develop greater security, sustainability, and resilience. The good news: achieving this is in Europe’s hands.
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.
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Publish date : 2024-10-30 05:13:00
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The post The next five years: How strong economic and trade alliances can prepare the EU for a post-America world first appeared on Love Europe.
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Author : love-europe
Publish date : 2024-10-30 13:42:02
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