On 20 October, Moldova will hold both a presidential election and a referendum on whether the country’s constitution should include its citizens’ wish for European Union membership. As it stands, Maia Sandu is expected to triumph with more than 35 per cent of the vote, while 65 per cent of surveyed Moldovans said they were likely to vote “yes” in the referendum. And the outcome will have a direct impact on Moldova’s ascension trajectory: while incumbent Sandu is pro-EU, other presidential candidates tend to advocate for Moldova to stay neutral and maintain ties with Russia. But as Moldova slowly gravitates towards the EU, Russia and its pro-Russian Moldovan proxies, under the leadership of fugitive politician Ilan Shor’s “Shor” party, are diversifying their interference techniques to disrupt the elections and derail the country’s EU ascension trajectory.
On 9 October, European Parliament members adopted a resolution issuing a strong warning against Russian attempts to interfere in Moldova’s democratic process. But Russia has already demonstrated its willingness to disrupt democracy in the country with impunity: according to a think-tank employee[1] in the autonomous Moldovan region of Gagauzia, Russia spent €4m on buying 27,000 votes for local elections held in 2023. This played a role in securing victory for Shor-affiliated politician Evghenia Gutul, the now-governor of Gagauzia. For the upcoming 20 October elections, pro-Russian proxies have provided 40,000 people across the region with Russian “Mir” cards – loaded with $100, they do not work in Moldova and can only be cashed out from banks in the breakaway, pro-Russian region of Transnistria. In exchange, recipients are required to send proof that they will cast their vote for a pro-Russian presidential candidate.
As a country, Moldova has a long road ahead in battling Russia’s deeply rooted disinformation network and vote-buying tactics. But tackling the issue is especially crucial in Moldova’s poorer regions, where according to an official working in Gagauzia Russia “instrumentalises the historically Russian-based culture and identity of the population to convince Gagauzians to lean towards their own interests.” In this region, where Russian is the primary language and 90 per cent of the population is affiliated to the Russian Orthodox church, a shared linguistic and religious identity makes it easier for pro-Russian propaganda to shape the population’s reality. For example, in 2014, 97 per cent of Gagauzians voted against Moldova’s EU ascension in an illegal referendum: even ten years on, Russia’s deep-rooted regional influence is alarming – especially with Moldova’s current trajectory meaning it more than likely it will soon become an EU member state.
To derail the process, however, Moscow is not simply relying on cold, hard cash bribes. According to local authorities in Moldova, pro-Russian proxies are – under Shor’s direction – vote-buying in their thousands: the country has three million registered voters, of which 48 per cent are expected to turn out. Although the overall number of bribed voters is expected to equal around 10 per cent of intended voters and is unlikely to defeat Sandu’s expected majority, it could impact the results of the referendum – just 0.7 per cent of Moldovans said they would only vote in the referendum (as oppose to 68 per cent saying they will vote in both elections), meaning the bribed voters could make an impact. And, as well as allegations of vote-buying, Shor has also publicly ramped up his anti-EU rhetoric: he is expected to outwardly endorse a pro-Russian presidential candidate just before the election, with an investigation conducted by Moldovan newspaper ZDG naming her as the independent, Victoria Furtuna.
But Josep Borrell, the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs, has recently praised Moldova’s efforts in countering thousands of monthly Russian hybrid attacks, commending “the resilience of the Moldovan government in face of these unprecedented challenges” and insisting that the EU continues supporting the security, stability, and resilience of Moldova. Moldova and the EU have also agreed on a security and defence partnership, which pushes for cooperation on shared security challenges such as fighting cyberattacks, and countering hybrid threats and disinformation. The agreement also emphasises the importance of building resilience in Moldovan society to Russian disinformation – for the EU, simply condemning Russian interference is not enough. There are therefore several practical areas in which both the Moldovan authorities and allied EU policymakers can intervene to prevent Russia shaping the election narrative beyond repair and derailing Moldova’s ascension dream.
The Moldovan authorities and allied EU policymakers can intervene in several ways to prevent Russia shaping the election narrative beyond repair – and derailing Moldova’s potential ascension dream
First, the media is a core proponent of Russian disinformation dissemination. In 2022, Chisinau successfully banned six Shor-affiliated television channels; but in Gagauzia, which is under the leadership of Gutul, Russian newspapers and tv stations are the population’s main source of media consumption. Channels promote pro-Russian narratives which aim to discredit Moldova’s EU trajectory, with Russian disinformation revolving mostly around instilling a fear of war – for example, 42 per cent of Moldovans surveyed by the Moldovan outpost of the American National Democratic Institute (NDI) fear the threat of military conflict. The channels also connect the EU with “woke” anti-conservative and pro-LGBT discourses, which might conflict with prevailing social attitudes in some of the country’s more conservative regions – which also tend to be its poorest.
But equally, governmental authorities can do more to limit media access in these regions. For example, Moldova should invest in the creation of Russian-speaking, Moldovan state-funded media channels to counter this anti-EU narrative, provide a diversity in media output, and promote Moldova’s EU ascension ambitions on a network free of harmful rhetoric. Moldova’s government could also promote and support the work of regional Russian-language but pro-European newspapers, especially in Gagauzia, which investigate Russian interference in Moldova and debunk disinformation through fact-checking.
Second, Moldova and EU policymakers should focus on providing more financial support to the populations in its poorest regions and deter locals from being tempted to participate in voter bribery. An researcher at the NDI in Chisinau found that 70 per cent of Moldovans polled were most worried about the cost of living – unsurprising in a country where the average gross salary is €641 euros a month. It is no wonder that Shor’s vote-buying and “Mir” card schemes are so successful in the most impoverished households. Moldova should better assist its low-income population and, with the help of the EU, invest in supporting local and pro-EU actors. They should focus on improving infrastructure and supporting local companies, attracting more investment, increasing local GDP, and decreasing the cost of living. In the long term, the improvement of life quality in poorer regions should therefore reduce the attractiveness of voter bribery.
On 20 October, the Moldovan authorities can actively support watchdog organisations monitoring election day activities – for example, maintaining a presence at election booths to ensure pro-Russian disrupters are not intimidating voters. But, in general, Moldova is well-equipped to develop an overall stronger resilience to Russian interference due to the resources and skills gathered throughout its vast experience of countering disinformation and bribery. Furthermore, the worst outcome for the elections could yield some positive results – Maia Sandu should still win the presidential election, even in the event that a positive referendum result does not come to pass.
However, Russia could hit back stronger in the future, and the EU must support Moldova in its democratic efforts to build societal resilience, for example through the new security and defence partnership. The bloc can also foster strategic partnerships between cybersecurity institutions within Moldova and the EU to counter cyberattacks and limit the spread of disinformation. But the EU cannot turn a blind eye to Moldova’s perseverance against Russian meddling in the country’s politics and society. Although the fight against Russian interference is not over, a Sandu victory – especially if backed by a winning “yes” for the EU referendum – would demonstrate to Russia that Moldovans are united in their target of obtaining a more European identity. In this context, the EU must also strongly support Moldova’s message that the country will not backtrack from its ascension journey.
[1] From a conversation held privately during a research trip to Moldova in early October 2024
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.
Author :
Publish date : 2024-10-18 12:03:00
Copyright for syndicated content belongs to the linked Source.
The post Votes for sale: How Moldova can combat Russia’s election meddling first appeared on Love Europe.
—-
Author : love-europe
Publish date : 2024-10-18 12:16:10
Copyright for syndicated content belongs to the linked Source.